In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the development of well-founded conceptual models for Service Management, Accounting Information Systems and Financial Reporting. Economic ex- changes are a central notion in these areas and they occupy a prominent position in frameworks such as the Resource-Event Action (REA) ISO Standard, service core ontologies (e.g., UFO-S) as well as financial stan- dards (e.g. OMG’s Financial Industry Business Ontology - FIBO). We present a core ontology for economic exchanges inspired by a (...) recent view on this phenomenon. According to this view, economic exchanges are based on an agreement on the actions that the agents are committed to perform. This view enables a unified treatment of economic exchanges, regardless the object of the transaction. We ground our core ontology on the Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO), discussing its formal and conceptual aspects, instantiating it as a reusable OntoUML model, and confronting it with the REA standard and the UFO-S service ontology. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in thedevelopment of ontologically well-founded conceptual models for Information Systems in areas such as Service Management, Accounting Information Systems and Financial Reporting. Economic exchanges are central phenomena in these areas. For this reason, they occupy a prominent position in modelling frameworks such as the REA (Resource-EventAction) ISO Standard as well as the FIBO (Financial Industry BusinessOntology). In this paper, we begin a well-founded ontological analysisof economic exchanges inspired by a recent ontological (...) view on the nature of economic transactions. According to this view, what counts asan economic transaction is based on an agreement on the actions thatthe agents are committed to perform. The agreement is in turn based on convergent preferences about the course of action to bring about. This view enables a unified treatment of economic exchanges, regardless the object of the transaction, and complies with the view that all economictransactions are about services. In this paper, we start developing our analysis in the framework of the Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO). (shrink)

MUDANÇAS, REVOLUÇÕES E SUAS IMPLICAÇÕES -/- CHANGES, REVOLUTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ, CAP-UFPE e UFRPE - [email protected] / [email protected] e WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- PREMISSA -/- A mudança social é um tema presente na Sociologia desde o seu início. Seria possível dizer que o surgimento da Sociologia está vinculado à discussão sobre as transformações sociais, ou seja, falar sobre a ciência da sociedade é falar sobre esse tema. Por isso mesmo, abordar o tema da (...) mudança social pressupõe lidar com a questão das resistências às possíveis transformações. Quando uma comunidade ou uma sociedade se depara com mudanças, de origem interna ou externa, há sempre resistência, pois há uma espécie de acomodação ao que já existe. Assim, as relações de poder, por exemplo, podem se modificar, num complexo jogo de resistência contra o poder e desejo de conquistá-lo ou ampliá-lo. Desse modo, confrontos e conflitos compõem o itinerário das mudanças e revoluções sociais. -/- Aqui serão objetos de análise dois grandes tipos de mudanças sociais: aquelas que, por seu caráter universal e multifacetado, afetaram toda a humanidade e aquelas de conotação sociopolítica, que atingiram determinadas sociedades e, depois, tornaram-se referência para outras mudanças. Serão, portanto, abordadas as revoluções agrícola e industrial e as recentes transformações e os episódios mais marcantes das revoluções políticas contemporâneas em todo o mundo. -/- A REVOLUÇÃO AGRÍCOLA -/- Esta revolução transformou radicalmente a forma de produção de alimentos das populações humanas. A expressão “revolução agrícola” foi criada pelo arqueólogo australiano Gordon Childe (1892-1957). Ela também é chamada de “revolução do Neolítico”, pois foi o período em que a humanidade desenvolveu a agricultura e as técnicas de cultivo de alimentos, como também aprendeu a domesticar e criar animais. Isso alterou o processo de obtenção de alimentos, pois as populações deixaram de ser coletoras e caçadoras e passaram, paulatinamente, a ter uma relação diferenciada com animais e plantas. Essas mudanças não ocorreram ao mesmo tempo em todos os lugares. Elas se iniciaram no Oriente Médio (há 9 ou 10 mil anos). Depois, no Egito (9 mil), na Índia (8 mil), na China (7 mil), na Europa (6,5 mil), na África tropical (5 mil) e na América, principalmente no México e no Peru (4,5 mil anos), através do deslocamento de hordas humanas ou movimentos independentes. O processo foi muito longo. Inicialmente, percebeu-se que os grãos que eram coletados para alimentação poderiam ser enterrados, isto é, “semeados”, a fim de produzir novas plantas iguais às que eram coletadas anteriormente. Assim, foi possível produzir trigo, cevada, milho, arroz e tubérculos (vários tipos de batatas); posteriormente, também árvores frutíferas. A partir de então, em consequência da experiência e da observação do que acontecia no meio ambiente, passou-se a selecionar sementes e outras árvores para plantio. Através da experiência prática, desenvolveu-se um conhecimento dos diferentes tipos de solo e de plantas, o que ajudou a aprimorar as técnicas de plantio e colheita, incluindo a observação da melhor época para o desenvolvimento de cada uma das culturas. Determinante para a fixação de grupos humanos (sedentarização) há milhares de anos, a agricultura ainda é a principal atividade de parte expressiva da população mundial. Essa atividade é a eminente na questão de desenvolvimento do Brasil, uma vez que o setor a cada ano emprega mais, a cada ano produz mais e a cada ano supera os índices de lucratividade anteriores, sendo, por fim, o baú do tesouro brasileiro. Voltando para a Revolução, outro elemento essencial desse processo foi a domesticação de animais. Junto com a agricultura, esse foi um passo muito importante para a alteração do modo de vida da humanidade, já que eliminou a necessidade do deslocamento para obtenção da carne e das peles necessárias ao conforto e também do leite dos rebanhos. A domesticação deve ter surgido espontaneamente em vários locais, resultado do processo de aproximação e observação dos animais no decurso das caçadas. O primeiro animal domesticado foi o cão; na sequência, animais para a alimentação e tração, como a cabra, o carneiro, o boi e o cavalo. Paralelamente a essas mudanças, alguns instrumentos foram sendo confeccionados, como a foice, o arado, a roda e outros que eram utilizados para arar a terra e até na colheita: novas tecnologias para um processo revolucionário. Esse processo intenso de subdivisões e deslocamentos provocou uma onda de difusão da agricultura e da atividade pastoril através das migrações. Imagine-se por um momento vivendo em grupos ou fazendo parte de hordas humanas, reproduzindo-se e subdividindo-se, migrando para outros locais, plantando e desenvolvendo a criação de animais em vários lugares, deslocando-se à procura de novos espaços e invadindo territórios de outros grupos, convivendo entre si ou em conflito, aprendendo e ensinando aos grupos com os quais estabeleceram alguma comunicação e submetendo-se ou sendo submetidos pelos habitantes com quem entraram em contato. Esse é apenas um pequeno esboço do que ocorreu nesse processo de transmissão e absorção de novas formas revolucionárias de viver. A grande revolução agrícola (que foi, em essência, a síntese de centenas de revoluções localizadas no tempo e no espaço e marcadas pela diversidade de ações e resultados) foi aquela que alterou de fato e profundamente toda a humanidade. Mas ela continua até hoje, uma vez que as transformações que ocorrem na produção de alimentos não estacionaram e mantêm um processo de mudança contínuo. Entretanto, existem ainda formas de organização social, como a de alguns poucos povos caçadores e coletores, que utilizam a agricultura e a domesticação de animais à moda antiga. -/- A REVOLUÇÃO INDUSTRIAL -/- O que se chama de Revolução Industrial na Europa nos séculos XVIII e XIX não é uma revolução puramente industrial, nem começou repentinamente nesses séculos. Foi um processo lento de transformação que se desenvolveu desde o século XV e atingiu grandes setores da produção, como o mineiro, o metalúrgico e o têxtil. A expansão da produção nesses setores envolveu a invenção de novas técnicas e máquinas, além de uma estrutura (a fábrica) que permitisse a concentração de equipamentos e trabalhadores num só lugar. Situadas quase sempre nas cidades, as fábricas requeriam muita mão de obra. Atraindo as pessoas que deixavam o campo em busca de trabalho, as cidades cresceram vertiginosamente. Transformava-se, assim, a forma de produzir bens e serviços, alterando as formas de viver e revolucionando as relações sociais. Mas isso não aconteceu de maneira uniforme no mundo todo. Para que se tenha ideia da multiplicidade das mudanças trazidas pela urbanização e pela industrialização, a Inglaterra conheceu esses fenômenos típicos da modernidade em torno de 1860; o Brasil, por volta da década de 1930; a China, a partir do final do século XX. A Revolução Industrial começou no setor têxtil, na produção da lã e do algodão, com o uso das máquinas de fiar conhecidas como Spinning Jenny (1764) e Spinning Mule (1789), inventadas, respectivamente, por James Hargreaves e Samuel Crompton. Nessa época, a produção era feita manualmente, com rocas de baixíssimo rendimento. Pode-se dizer que, paralelamente à Revolução Industrial, houve na Europa uma segunda revolução agrícola. Ela teve início com a mudança na estrutura da propriedade rural, quando os proprietários de terras se juntaram a ricos comerciantes das cidades interessados em investir na agricultura e promoveram a introdução de novas técnicas de cultivo, entre as quais a rotação de culturas sem pousio (parcela de terras em repouso), de forma a retirar o máximo proveito das terras; a drenagem de terras pantanosas; o abate de florestas; e a ocupação de terras comunais. No intuito de melhorar a produção, promoveram a seleção das espécies mais produtivas, de sementes e o apuramento dos melhores rebanhos. Além disso, foram introduzidas máquinas e houve melhora nos transportes no espaço agrário. Isso permitiu relativa abundância em produtos agrícolas essenciais (carne, leite e derivados, legumes, tubérculos, cereais etc.), que juntamente com a indústria extrativa do sal, indispensável para a conservação dos alimentos, propiciou a melhoria gradual na dieta alimentar. Essas mudanças e a diminuição crescente da mortalidade propiciaram o que se pode chamar de revolução demográfica. Para se ter uma ideia, na Inglaterra, onde a Revolução teve início, a população em 1750 era de 6,5 milhões; em 1801 passou a 16,3 milhões e, em 1851, somava 27,5 milhões. Isso exigiu um aumento da produção e de matérias-primas vegetais e animais (transformadas nas fábricas). No século XIX, outras transformações ocorreram em face da emergência de novas fontes energéticas (eletricidade e petróleo) e de novos ramos industriais, o que resultou em alteração profunda nos processos produtivos, com a introdução de novas máquinas e equipamentos. Todas essas transformações propiciaram mudanças nas comunicações (telégrafo e telefone), nos meios de transporte (navio e trem a vapor, automóvel) e também em todas as esferas da vida (familiar, educacional, jurídica, governamental etc.). Além disso, provocaram o surgimento de inovações na arte, na literatura e nas ciências. -/- AS REVOLUÇÕES CONTEMPORÂNEAS -/- Há uma grande transformação em curso nas sociedades humanas. Os grandes artífices dessas mudanças cada vez mais radicais são as inovações tecnológicas e os resultados alcançados pela evolução dos processos científicos. É difícil demarcar espaços que estejam imunes a essa era de revoluções múltiplas e de largo alcance: de algum modo, todas as culturas estão imersas nessa nova fase da aldeia global, em que tudo e todos parecem estar condenados à interconexão e às novas realidades na microeletrônica, na genética de laboratório e na nanotecnologia, para citar apenas alguns dos “admiráveis mundos novos”. A microeletrônica revolucionou a escala produtiva de bens e serviços mediante o desenvolvimento de sistemas computacionais. Provocou uma mudança significativa também nos meios de comunicação. O uso de celulares, smartphones, computadores pessoais e portáteis, tablets e outros tantos equipamentos está alterando a forma de as pessoas e organizações públicas e privadas se comunicarem e se estruturarem. Novos componentes eletrônicos produzidos com base na nanotecnologia poderão revolucionar o que hoje conhecemos por computação, permitindo a produção de computadores pessoais com muitos processadores, extremamente rápidos e com enorme capacidade de armazenamento. No futuro, os nanoprocessadores provavelmente estarão presentes na maioria dos objetos que utilizaremos. Por meio da microeletrônica e da nanotecnologia, o nível de desenvolvimento da bioengenharia (ou engenharia genética) beirará a ficção científica. A manipulação genética, com o aprofundamento do conhecimento do DNA humano, de plantas e animais, será ampliada. As pesquisas mais divulgadas nessa área se referem às possibilidades de intervenção no campo da Medicina, como as vinculadas à utilização de células-tronco, à produção de vacinas e medicamentos específicos, à produção sintética de elementos essenciais à saúde humana (como a insulina e a albumina), à análise genética das doenças e à consequente terapia gênica, aos transplantes, ao mapeamento genético dos indivíduos, à formação de bancos de genoma de espécies em extinção, à recuperação de DNA de espécies extintas e até à clonagem de animais. Essas transformações podem gerar, entretanto, novos desafios e suscitar questões atreladas, por exemplo, à privacidade dos indivíduos, ao acesso desigual à tecnologia, aos riscos ambientais (aos seres vivos, incluindo os humanos), às relações sociais e de trabalho, às mudanças de valores e normas sociais e, principalmente, às possibilidades de maior liberdade e igualdade ou maior opressão/controle, além de maior ou menor desigualdade social. A Sociologia, que, como vimos, nasceu na Europa no contexto de grandes transformações, propõe debates sobre essas novas tecnologias e as mudanças sociais provocadas pelo uso delas. São necessários novos olhares, novos conceitos e teorias para dar conta desses elementos que estão afetando a vida humana em todos os sentidos. A utilização de novos saberes e tecnologias alterará a pesquisa em todas as ciências, permitindo mais aprofundamento, através de novos equipamentos, com modificações sensíveis nos modos de conhecer o mundo. A aplicação e o desenvolvimento científicos exercerão impacto na maioria das indústrias existentes, em áreas como as de sistemas de construção, transportes, comunicações, maquinário agrícola, e, é claro, na prestação de serviços. Será possível fabricar materiais cem vezes mais resistentes que o aço, carros cuja lataria não estará sujeita a riscos, espelhos antiofuscantes, aviões mais leves, jornais eletrônicos de plástico semelhante ao papel, tintas que mudam de cor etc. No cotidiano, roupas que não amassam ou que não cheiram mesmo depois de absorver muito suor poderão ser compradas em supermercados; do mesmo modo, tecidos que controlam a temperatura do corpo, adaptando-o confortavelmente à temperatura do ar, serão vendidos a preços acessíveis em toda parte, ao lado de vestimentas que auxiliam no emagrecimento e em diversas atividades orientadas por médicos e profissionais de saúde e esporte. O futuro, então, logo trará roupas impermeáveis, inodoras e que não mancham, as chamadas roupas interativas. Esses são exemplos simples do que já existe, mas ainda não em escala industrial para consumo massivo. A presença de robôs no processo produtivo já é uma realidade insofismável e pode-se prever que em pouco tempo eles farão serviços domésticos e outras várias atividades que hoje são desenvolvidas por pessoas de carne, osso e alma. Veículos autônomos, ou os automóveis que andam sozinhos, estão sendo desenvolvidos e alguns já são utilizados para a alegria e o espanto de muita gente. Na área ambiental, a revolução tecnológica poderá ocorrer em muitos campos. Ganharão muita visibilidade o uso de materiais alternativos e a utilização do que hoje chamamos de resíduos industriais ou domésticos na fabricação de mercadorias. Todos esses resíduos, que hoje são descartados, inclusive os chamados não recicláveis, podem passar a ser matérias-primas para diferentes setores da economia. A máxima de Lavoisier (1743-1794) seria então plenamente consagrada: Na natureza nada se cria, nada se perde, tudo se transforma. Nem tudo são flores, entretanto. Acesso desigual aos frutos dessas mudanças; prejuízos ao meio ambiente (riscos aos seres vivos, incluindo os humanos), às relações sociais e de trabalho, aos valores e normas sociais e, principalmente, às possibilidades de maior liberdade e igualdade ou mais opressão e controle, além de maiores ou menores desigualdades sociais. Um conjunto de situações novas para as quais ainda não se tem respostas pode surgir da expansão tecnológica e do desenvolvimento da ciência. Assim como a energia atômica trouxe benefícios extraordinários e malefícios estarrecedores à humanidade, novas tecnologias e inovadores processos científicos poderão trazer grandes soluções e reviravoltas nas formas de ser e de viver, bem como enormes e imprevisíveis prejuízos e destruições. -/- BREVE CONCLUSÃO -/- As revoluções do passado e do presente se estenderão ainda por muito tempo, uma vez que são expressões da atividade humana, a qual transforma o meio e é por ele transformada. Não há transformações que não retenham algo do passado e, ao mesmo tempo, delineiem alguns traços do futuro, pois as mudanças, por mais radicais que sejam, sempre conservam algo. Além disso elas não ocorrem em todos os lugares nem atingem a todos da mesma forma, deixando abertas as portas da história. Essa imprevisibilidade da ação humana, calcada no tempo anterior e orientada para os dias posteriores, dá graça e mistério à existência, tornando a vida em sociedade um desafio de conquistas fabulosas e um palco de derrotas lampejantes. -/- REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO -/- ALMOND, M.; BATISTA, G. O livro de ouro das Revoluções. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2018. -/- TOMAZI, N. D.; ROSSI, M. A. Sociologia para o ensino médio. Vol. Único. 5ª ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2016. -/- Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva © 2019 Estimule a criatividade, respeite o direito autoral. -/- . (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...) animal beliefs as genuine beliefs. It has a range of further benefits: it helps us account for epistemic normativity, paves the way for better psychological models of belief revision, distinguishes beliefs from imaginings and mere acceptances, and helps us avoid noxious simplistic takes on human irrationality. (shrink)

Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...) that the evidence they have against them is often overstated. I draw on this discussion to consider whether delusions are evidentially supported and epistemically rational. Finally, I discuss implications for the nature of delusion, responsibility, and treatment and suggest directions for future research. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to different conceptions of evidence and rationality in epistemology. -/- A central upshot is that what we should say about the epistemic standing of delusions depends substantively on our positions in epistemology, in particular, on the debate between internalists and externalists about evidence. If we want clarity on the epistemic standing of delusions, we need to incorporate more sophisticated tools from epistemology. (shrink)

This paper argues that, by construing emotion as epistemologically subversive, the Western tradition has tended to obscure the vital role of emotion in the construction of knowledge. The paper begins with an account of emotion that stresses its active, voluntary, and socially constructed aspects, and indicates how emotion is involved in evaluation and observation. It then moves on to show how the myth of dispassionate investigation has functioned historically to undermine the epistemic authority of women as well as other social (...) groups associated culturally with emotion. Finally, the paper sketches some ways in which the emotions of underclass groups, especially women, may contribute to the development of a critical social theory. (shrink)

We have a much better understanding of physics than we do of consciousness. I consider ways in which intrinsically mental aspects of fundamental ontology might induce modifications of the known laws of physics, or whether they could be relevant to accounting for consciousness if no such modifications exist. I suggest that our current knowledge of physics should make us skeptical of hypothetical modifications of the known rules, and that without such modifications it’s hard to imagine how intrinsically mental aspects could (...) play a useful explanatory role. Draft version of a paper submitted to Journal of Consciousness Studies, special issue responding to Philip Goff’s Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness. (shrink)

I defend the extremist position that the fundamental ontology of the world consists of a vector in Hilbert space evolving according to the Schrödinger equation. The laws of physics are determined solely by the energy eigenspectrum of the Hamiltonian. The structure of our observed world, including space and fields living within it, should arise as a higher-level emergent description. I sketch how this might come about, although much work remains to be done.

Some modern cosmological models predict the appearance of Boltzmann Brains: observers who randomly fluctuate out of a thermal bath rather than naturally evolving from a low-entropy Big Bang. A theory in which most observers are of the Boltzmann Brain type is generally thought to be unacceptable, although opinions differ. I argue that such theories are indeed unacceptable: the real problem is with fluctuations into observers who are locally identical to ordinary observers, and their existence cannot be swept under the rug (...) by a choice of probability distributions over observers. The issue is not that the existence of such observers is ruled out by data, but that the theories that predict them are cognitively unstable: they cannot simultaneously be true and justifiably believed. (shrink)

It is commonplace in discussions of modern cosmology to assert that the early universe began in a special state. Conventionally, cosmologists characterize this fine-tuning in terms of the horizon and flatness problems. I argue that the fine-tuning is real, but these problems aren't the best way to think about it: causal disconnection of separated regions isn't the real problem, and flatness isn't a problem at all. Fine-tuning is better understood in terms of a measure on the space of trajectories: given (...) reasonable conditions in the late universe, the fraction of cosmological histories that were smooth at early times is incredibly tiny. This discussion helps clarify what is required by a complete theory of cosmological initial conditions. (shrink)

Foundational ontologies, central constructs in ontological investigations and engineering alike, are based on ontological categories. Firstly proposed by Aristotle as the very ur- elements from which the whole of reality can be derived, they are not easy to identify, let alone partition and/or hierarchize; in particular, the question of their number poses serious challenges. The late medieval philosopher Dietrich of Freiberg wrote around 1286 a tutorial that can help us today with this exceedingly difficult task. In this paper, I discuss (...) ontological categories and their importance for foundational ontologies from both the contemporary perspective and the original Aristotelian viewpoint, I provide the translation from the Latin into English of Dietrich's De origine II with an introductory elaboration, and I extract a foundational ontology–that is in fact a single-category one–from this text rooted in Dietrich's specification of types of subjecthood and his conception of intentionality as causal operation. (shrink)

In this paper an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) model, for predicting the category of a tumor was developed and tested. Taking patients’ tests, a number of information gained that influence the classification of the tumor. Such information as age, sex, histologic-type, degree-of-diffe, status of bone, bone-marrow, lung, pleura, peritoneum, liver, brain, skin, neck, supraclavicular, axillar, mediastinum, and abdominal. They were used as input variables for the ANN model. A model based on the Multilayer Perceptron Topology was established and trained using (...) data set which its title is “primary tumor” and was obtained from the University Medical Centre, Institute of Oncology, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia Test data evaluation shows that the ANN model is able to correctly predict the tumor category with 76.67 % accuracy. (shrink)

Cosmological models that invoke a multiverse - a collection of unobservable regions of space where conditions are very different from the region around us - are controversial, on the grounds that unobservable phenomena shouldn't play a crucial role in legitimate scientific theories. I argue that the way we evaluate multiverse models is precisely the same as the way we evaluate any other models, on the basis of abduction, Bayesian inference, and empirical success. There is no scientifically respectable way to do (...) cosmology without taking into account different possibilities for what the universe might be like outside our horizon. Multiverse theories are utterly conventionally scientific, even if evaluating them can be difficult in practice. (shrink)

In the Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics, probabilities—and thus quantum states—represent an agent’s degrees of belief, rather than corresponding to objective properties of physical systems. In this paper we investigate the concept of certainty in quantum mechanics. Particularly, we show how the probability-1 predictions derived from pure quantum states highlight a fundamental difference between our Bayesian approach, on the one hand, and Copenhagen and similar interpretations on the other. We first review the main arguments for the general claim that probabilities (...) always represent degrees of belief. We then argue that a quantum state prepared by some physical device always depends on an agent’s prior beliefs, implying that the probability-1 predictions derived from that state also depend on the agent’s prior beliefs. Quantum certainty is therefore always some agent’s certainty. Conversely, if facts about an experimental setup could imply agent-independent certainty for a measurement outcome, as in many Copenhagen-like interpretations, that outcome would effectively correspond to a preexisting system property. The idea that measurement outcomes occurring with certainty correspond to preexisting system properties is, however, in conflict with locality. We emphasize this by giving a version of an argument of Stairs [(1983). Quantum logic, realism, and value-definiteness. Philosophy of Science, 50, 578], which applies the Kochen–Specker theorem to an entangled bipartite system. (shrink)

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

Philosophers of science turned to historical case studies in part in response to Thomas Kuhn's insistence that such studies can transform the philosophy of science. In this issue Joseph Pitt argues that the power of case studies to instruct us about scientific methodology and epistemology depends on prior philosophical commitments, without which case studies are not philosophically useful. Here I reply to Pitt, demonstrating that case studies, properly deployed, illustrate styles of scientific work and modes of argumentation that are not (...) well handled by currently standard philosophical analyses. I illustrate these claims with exemplary findings from case studies dealing with exploratory experimentation and with interdisciplinary cooperation across sciences to yield multiple independent means of access to theoretical entities. The latter cases provide examples of ways that scientists support claims about theoretical entities that are not available in work performed within a single discipline. They also illustrate means of correcting systematic biases that stem from the commitments of each discipline taken separately. These findings illustrate the transformative power of case study methods, allow us to escape from the horns of Pitt's "dilemma of case studies," and vindicate some of the post-Kuhn uses to which case studies have been put. (shrink)

A consensus exists among contemporary philosophers of biology about the history of their field. According to the received view, mainstream philosophy of science in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s focused on physics and general epistemology, neglecting analyses of the 'special sciences', including biology. The subdiscipline of philosophy of biology emerged (and could only have emerged) after the decline of logical positivism in the 1960s and 70s. In this article, I present bibliometric data from four major philosophy of science journals (Erkenntnis, (...) Philosophy of Science, Synthese, and the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science), covering 1930-59, which challenge this view. (shrink)

It seems natural to ask why the universe exists at all. Modern physics suggests that the universe can exist all by itself as a self-contained system, without anything external to create or sustain it. But there might not be an absolute answer to why it exists. I argue that any attempt to account for the existence of something rather than nothing must ultimately bottom out in a set of brute facts; the universe simply is, without ultimate cause or explanation.

We study the question of how to decompose Hilbert space into a preferred tensor-product factorization without any pre-existing structure other than a Hamiltonian operator, in particular the case of a bipartite decomposition into "system" and "environment." Such a decomposition can be defined by looking for subsystems that exhibit quasi-classical behavior. The correct decomposition is one in which pointer states of the system are relatively robust against environmental monitoring (their entanglement with the environment does not continually and dramatically increase) and remain (...) localized around approximately-classical trajectories. We present an in-principle algorithm for finding such a decomposition by minimizing a combination of entanglement growth and internal spreading of the system. Both of these properties are related to locality in different ways. This formalism could be relevant to the emergence of spacetime from quantum entanglement. (shrink)

Niettegenstaande de tendens van het failliet van het multiculturalisme is multiculturele dialoog niet weg te denken in een zich globaliserende wereld. Taylor, Gadamer, Honneth en Kymlicka hebben een bijdrage geleverd op het vlak van de erkenning van identiteit, respect en waardering van verschil. Wij voeren het argument aan dat bovenstaande auteurs niet ontsnappen aan het postmodernistisch dilemma van zelfautonomie en slachtofferschap. Dit komt doordat zij in hun rationale vertrekken van het afzonderlijke subject en deze situeren in een ruimte-tijd waarin de (...) tijd slechts een historische rol heeft en de ruimte geen actieve rol speelt. Tegenover deze uitvloeisels van het postmodern denken stellen wij het eco-communau-tarisme. Vanuit de vaststelling dat het individu denkt, spreek en handelt in de context van zijn taal en cultuur en dus vanuit zijn gemeenschap, situeren wij dit subject en de gemeenschap tevens in een particulier territorium of het ecotoop. Door middel van Hacking’s sociaal constructivisme, het Leibniziaanse meerwereldenbeeld en het biologische paradigma als nieuw denkkader, structureren wij de gemeenschap volgens een cyclisch en een lineair tijdverloop. Het cyclische waarborgt de traditie van een gemeenschap, het lineaire doet de gemeenschap evolueren naar een moreel betere toekomst en heeft een transcendent statuut. Het eco-communautarisme biedt het kader voor een kwalitatieve evolutie van individuen en gemeenschappen. Het normerend aspect hiervan is de pluriforme en multiculturele dialoog. (shrink)

Recent theorizing argues that online communication technologies provide powerful, although precarious, means of emotional regulation. We develop this understanding further. Drawing on subjective reports collected during periods of imposed social restrictions under COVID-19, we focus on how this precarity is a source of emo-tional dysregulation. We make our case by organizing responses into five distinct but intersecting dimensions wherein the precarity of this regulation is most relevant: infrastructure, functional use, mindful design (individual and social), and digital tact. Analyzing these reports, (...) along with examples of mediating technologies (i.e., self-view) and common interactive dynamics (e.g., gaze coordination), we tease out how breakdowns along these dimensions are sources of affective dysregulation. We argue that the adequacy of available technological resources and competencies of various kinds matter greatly to the types of emotional experiences one is likely to have online. Further research into online communication technologies as modula-tors of both our individual and collective well-being is urgently needed, especially as the echoes of the digital push that COVID-19 initiated are set to continue rever-berating into the future. (shrink)

One widely used method for allocating health care resources involves the use of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to rank treatments in terms of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) gained. CEA has been criticized for discriminating against people with disabilities by valuing their lives less than those of non-disabled people. Avoiding discrimination seems to lead to the ’QALY trap’: we cannot value saving lives equally and still value raising quality of life. This paper reviews existing responses to the QALY trap and argues that all (...) are problematic. Instead, we argue that adopting a moderate form of prioritarianism avoids the QALY trap and disability discrimination. (shrink)

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

Recently, the concept of "gender identity" has enjoyed a great deal of attention in gender metaphysics. This seems to be motivated by the goal of creating trans-inclusive theory, by explaining trans people's genders. In this paper, we aim to unmotivate this project. Notions of "gender identity" serve important pragmatic purposes for trans people, such as satisfying the curiosity of non-trans people, and, relatedly, securing our access to important goods like legal rights and medical care. However, we argue that this does (...) not mean that "gender identity" is a metaphysically substantial thing that deserves extensive theoretical attention. There are reasons to be skeptical of such a concept. We trace the history of "gender identity," primarily to identify its roots in trans-antagonistic medical theory and its connections to the problematic "wrong-body" model--a legacy that has pathologized and flattened trans experience. Moreover, we argue that trans people primarily use "gender identity" to explain ourselves to non-trans people, rather than to discuss ourselves among ourselves. Thus, we urge theorists to resist the urge to substantiate gender identity. Instead, we encourage the development of new and better concepts, ones that attend to the lived realities of trans community and the flourishing gender terms and practices that are constructed there. If these lived realities are taken seriously, there is no need to “explain” trans people’s genders; we can simply see them as they are. (shrink)

We provide a derivation of the Born Rule in the context of the Everett (Many-Worlds) approach to quantum mechanics. Our argument is based on the idea of self-locating uncertainty: in the period between the wave function branching via decoherence and an observer registering the outcome of the measurement, that observer can know the state of the universe precisely without knowing which branch they are on. We show that there is a uniquely rational way to apportion credence in such cases, which (...) leads directly to the Born Rule. Our analysis generalizes straightforwardly to cases of combined classical and quantum self-locating uncertainty, as in the cosmological multiverse. (shrink)

Commentary on Pablo Hubacher Haerle’s paper “Is OCD Epistemically Irrational?”. I argue for expanding our assessment of rationality in OCD by considering a wider range of epistemic parameters and how they fit together.

Effective Field Theory (EFT) is the successful paradigm underlying modern theoretical physics, including the "Core Theory" of the Standard Model of particle physics plus Einstein's general relativity. I will argue that EFT grants us a unique insight: each EFT model comes with a built-in specification of its domain of applicability. Hence, once a model is tested within some domain (of energies and interaction strengths), we can be confident that it will continue to be accurate within that domain. Currently, the Core (...) Theory has been tested in regimes that include all of the energy scales relevant to the physics of everyday life (biology, chemistry, technology, etc.). Therefore, we have reason to be confident that the laws of physics underlying the phenomena of everyday life are completely known. (shrink)

Many real-world agents recognise that they impose harms by choosing to emit carbon, e.g., by flying. Yet many do so anyway, and then attempt to make things right by offsetting those harms. Such offsetters typically believe that, by offsetting, they change the deontic status of their behaviour, making an otherwise impermissible action permissible. Do they succeed in practice? Some philosophers have argued that they do, since their offsets appear to reverse the adverse effects of their emissions. But we show that (...) they do not. In practice, standard carbon offsetting does not reverse the harms of the original action, nor does it even benefit the same group as was harmed. Standard moral theories hence deny that such offsetting succeeds. Indeed, we show that any moral theory that allows offsetting in this setting faces a dilemma between allowing any wrong to be offset, no matter how grievous, and recognising an implausibly sharp discontinuity between offsettable actions and non-offsettable actions. The most plausible response is to accept that carbon offsetting fails to right our climate wrongs. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the traditional interpretations of Kant’s Formula of a Law of Nature from recent attacks leveled by Faviola Rivera-Castro, James Furner, Ido Geiger, Pauline Kleingeld and Sven Nyholm. After a short introduction, the paper is divided into four main sections. In the first, I set out the basics of the three traditional interpretations, the Logical Contradiction Interpretation, the Practical Contradiction Interpretation and the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation. In the second, I examine the work of Geiger, Kleingeld and (...) Nyholm: these three commentators reject the traditional interpretations entirely, but I argue that this rejection is ill-founded. In the third and fourth, I take a detailed look at Furner’s work, work in which he seeks to revise (rather than reject) the traditional interpretations. I argue that, despite his more modest aims, Furner’s revision is also ill-founded. (shrink)

Genera, typically hand-in-hand with their branching species, are essential elements of vocabulary-based information constructs, in particular scientific taxonomies. Should they also feature in formal ontologies, the highest of such constructs? I argue in this article that the answer is “Yes” and that the question posed in its title also has a Yes-answer: The way medieval ontologists sliced up the world into genera does matter to formal ontology. More specifically, the way Dietrich of Freiberg, a Latin scholastic, conceived and applied strictly (...) generic criteria to slice up the world into its entities can provide some guidelines to the field of formal ontology with respect to not only its contents, but also its scope. In particular, Dietrich's information criterion plays here a central role. (shrink)

Recently, Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) got much attention from researchers even though ITS educational technology began in the late 1960s and ITS is just embryonic from laboratories into the field. In this paper we outline an intelligent tutoring system for teaching basics of the databases system called (MDB). The MDB was built as education system by using the authoring tool (ITSB). MDB contains learning materials as a group of lessons for beginner level which include relational database system and lessons in (...) the process to install and set up a database. MDB system has exams for each level of the Lessons. An evaluation was done to see the effectiveness the MDB among learners and instructors. The outcome of the evaluation was promising. (shrink)

Enclosed is a guidebook for philanthropists, advocates, and policymakers who want to do the most good possible. This book introduces the philosophy of “longtermism,” the idea that it is particularly important that we act now to safeguard future generations. -/- The future is vast in scale: depending on our choices in the coming centuries, the future could stretch for eons or it could dwindle into oblivion, and be inordinately good or inordinately bad. And yet future generations are utterly disenfranchised in (...) the world today: they cannot participate in our markets, our movements, or our civil society. This presents 21st Century philanthropists with a historically unprecedented opportunity to do good by protecting the long-term future. -/- The essays within are from the pioneers who have developed the intellectual foundations of longtermism, as well as the experts and advocates who are now putting it into practice. Readers will hear the case for longtermism from professors at the University of Oxford and Longview’s own founders; longtermist policy proposals from political philosophers, members of the House of Lords, and the All-party Parliamentary Group for Future Generations; the case for work on biosecurity, artificial intelligence, and climate change from leading experts; and the first ever essay on longtermist cultural change from the former Chief of Cabinet to the Finnish President. -/- Together, these essays chart the path forward toward maximising the good that we do for our grandchildren, our grandchildren’s grandchildren, and every generation beyond. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there would be no obligatory maxims if the only standards for assessing maxims were Kant’s universalizability tests. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first, I clarify my thesis: I define my terms and disambiguate my thesis from other related theses for which one might argue. In the second, I confront the view that says that if a maxim passes the universalizability tests, then there is a positive duty to adopt that maxim; (...) I also confront a close relative of this view. In the third, I confront the view that says that if a maxim does not pass the universalizability tests, then there is a positive duty to adopt the contradictory of that maxim. In the fourth, I confront two variations of the view that says that if a maxim does not pass the universalizability tests and an agent is deliberating about the action in the maxim, then the agent has a positive duty to adopt the contrary of that maxim. In the fifth, I confront the view that says that if an agent has adopted a maxim of ends, then the agent has a positive duty to universalize that end. I then wrap up the paper with some concluding remarks. (shrink)

This article comprises an up-to-date critical review of the field known as Economic Methodology or Philosophy of Economics (EM/PE). Two edited volumes (Kincaid and Ross 2021; Heilmann and Reiss 2021), a special issue of the Journal of Economic Methodology (2021), and a recent bibliometric analysis of the field (Claveau et al. 2021) constitute the basis of the review. Drawing on these sources, we identify a number of problematic trends in current EM/PE research. We claim that these trends could be interpreted (...) as two kinds of biases, namely a micro-level bias and a mainstream bias. We discuss the respective details of these biases and their normative implications for the discipline. (shrink)

Psychiatric patients sometimes ask where to draw the line between who they are – their selves – and their mental illness. This problem is referred to as the self-illness ambiguity in the literature; it has been argued that solving said ambiguity is a crucial part of psychiatric treatment. I distinguish a Realist Solution from a Constructivist one. The former requires finding a supposedly pre-existing border, in the psychiatric patient’s mental life, between that which belongs to the self and that which (...) belongs to the mental illness. I argue that no such border exists, and that attempts to find it might even render the felt ambiguity worse. Instead, any solution must be constructivist; the patient (and others) should deliberate and discuss what to identify with or not. I further argue that psychiatric patients need not see their mental illness as wholly distinct from themselves to avoid ‘identifying with their diagnoses' in a problematic way. Finally, we can excuse problematic behaviour by mentally ill people – in fact, we can do so in a more nuanced and constructive way – while rejecting the view that the mental illness is wholly distinct from the patient’s self. (shrink)

In this paper, we developed an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) for detect the absence or presence of lung cancer in human body. Symptoms were used to diagnose the lung cancer, these symptoms such as Yellow fingers, Anxiety, Chronic Disease, Fatigue, Allergy, Wheezing, Coughing, Shortness of Breath, Swallowing Difficulty and Chest pain. They were used and other information about the person as input variables for our ANN. Our ANN established, trained, and validated using data set, which its title is “survey lung (...) cancer”. Model evaluation showed that the ANN model is able to detect the absence or presence of lung cancer with 96.67 % accuracy. (shrink)

In Morality & Mathematics, Justin Clarke-Doane argues that it is hard to imagine being "a realist about, for example, the standard model of particle physics, but not about mathematics." I try to explain how that seems very possible from the perspective of a physicist. What is real is the physical world; mathematics starts from descriptions of the natural world and extrapolates from there, but that extrapolation does not imply any independent reality. -/- Submitted to an Analysis Reviews symposium on Clarke-Doane's (...) Morality & Mathematics. (shrink)

Building on my previous exploration of the role of dance in the contemporary French political philosopher Jacques Rancière’s Aisthesis: Scenes from the Aesthetic Regime of Art, first published in French in 2011, the present essay turns to another book originally published in the same year, The Intervals of Cinema. Having previously established that the core of Rancière’s philosophical method is an analysis of philosophical homonyms into figurative dancing conceptual partners, I begin by applying that method to the first chapter of (...) Intervals, “Cinematic Vertigo: Hitchcock to Vertov and Back.” There I identify two series of such dancing partners, as follows: Hitchcock’s image-controlling, capitalist vertiginous fall, and Vertov’s movement-equalizing, communist balanced dance. I then critique the implicit marginalizing of women and female bodies in the films and chapter, including Hitchcock’s protagonist’s best friend and ex-fiancé, and Vertov’s cosmetologists and switchboard operators. Finally, I offer a corrective from the proto-feminist life of my grandmother, a onetime cosmetologist, switchboard operator, and Glamour Shots amateur model, my grandmother, Louise Nunnelley, or “Mamaw.” Such are the unacknowledged material basis of Rancière’s radical democratic philosophy, the specifically-embodied and positioned female dancers who continue to get lost in his figurative dance. (shrink)

The policy of earmarked paternity leave aims to promote mothers’ position in the labor market and fathers’ relationship with their child. Critics argue that the policy prevents parents from pursuing their own ideas about what is best for them. This provides reason to consider whether the policy is paternalistic or, in other ways, disrespectful of parental autonomy. I argue that the state implicates itself in the gender inequalities that result from parents’ unequal parental leave agreements when the state financially facilitates (...) such agreements. This argument for earmarked paternity leave is not disrespectful of parental autonomy. (shrink)

This paper generalizes the (epistemic) preface paradox beyond the principle of belief aggregation and constructs a similar paradox for deontic reasoning. The analysis of the deontic case yields a solution strategy---restricting belief/obligation aggregation rather than giving it up altogether---that can be transferred to the epistemic case. Our proposal amounts to a reasonable compromise between two goals: (i) sticking to bridge principles between evidence and belief, such as the Lockean Thesis, and (ii) obtaining a sufficiently strong logic of doxastic and deontic (...) reasoning. (shrink)

MMA fighting in a competition is not necessarily wrong and is often, as far as we can tell, permissible. Our argument has two premises. First, if an act does not infringe on anyone’s moral right or violate another side-constraint, then it is morally permissible. Second, MMA-violence does not infringe on anyone’s moral right or violate another side-constraint. The first premise rested on two assumptions. First, if a person does a wrong act, then he wrongs someone. Second, if one person wrongs (...) a second, then the first infringes on the second’s right. We then looked at Nicholas Dixon’s powerful Kantian argument that MMA fighting is wrong. (shrink)

The primary aim of this chapter is to show that several missteps made by others in in their thinking about law as an artefact are due to misconceptions about the role of intentions in understanding law as an artefact. I first briefly recap my own contention that law is a genre of institutionalized abstract artefacts (put forth in The Functions of Law (OUP 2016) and subsequent papers), mostly following Searle’s understanding of institutions and Thomasson’s understanding of public artefacts. I highlight (...) the central place that this theory affords law’s functions, without requiring the theorist to say that possession or performance of the function is either necessary or sufficient for inclusion in the class of law. Some of the most common misunderstandings are exemplified in Brian Leiter’s paper ‘Legal Positivism about the Artifact Law’. He thinks that holding an intentionalist view of artefacts commits the theorist to privileging drafters’ intentions when interpreting law. (It doesn’t.) He also has confusions about the differences between artefact tokens and artefact types leading him to a problematically broad understanding of artefacts. Another problem can be seen in thinking that functional understandings of artefacts are vulnerable to the same problems that arise in functional explanations for biological systems. I go on to consider the work of Luka Burazin and Corrado Roversi, addressing worries that making intentionality central to artefacts implies too much conscious thought is required to make one, noting that several theories of intentionality do not require conscious thought in the execution of intentional action. While those who think a central place for intentionality threatens to leave us unable to explain customary law, this can be dealt with by noting the important distinction between customary rules and customary laws (where the latter requires a decision to enlist public aid in redressing violations). I claim that authors’ intentions are communicated requests for the artefacts’ audiences to see the artefacts as members of their putative kinds. Finally, I address the question of whether or not legal systems are themselves artefacts and institutions, given that they may or may not have been intentionally created. An early lawgiver might have created a legal system by accident in the process of handing down the first laws. I raise the possibility that we might want to impute intentionality to necessary by-products of artefact creation, seeing those by-products as artefacts as well. (shrink)

Inspired by the early Wittgenstein’s concept of nonsense (meaning that which lies beyond the limits of language), we define two different, yet complementary, types of nonsense: formal nonsense and pragmatic nonsense. The simpler notion of formal nonsense is initially defined within Tarski’s semantic theory of truth; the notion of pragmatic nonsense, by its turn, is formulated within the context of the theory of pragmatic truth, also known as quasi-truth, as formalized by da Costa and his collaborators. While an expression will (...) be considered formally nonsensical if the formal criteria required for the assignment of any truth-value (whether true, false, pragmatically true, or pragmatically false) to such sentence are not met, a (well-formed) formula will be considered pragmatically nonsensical if the pragmatic criteria (inscribed within the context of scientific practice) required for the assignment of any truth-value to such sentence are not met. Thus, in the context of the theory of pragmatic truth, any (well-formed) formula of a formal language interpreted on a simple pragmatic structure will be considered pragmatically nonsensical if the set of primary sentences of such structure is not well-built, that is, if it does not include the relevant observational data and/or theoretical results, or if it does include sentences that are inconsistent with such data. (shrink)

Knowledge representation (KR) is actually more than representation: It involves also inference, namely inference of “new” knowledge, i.e. new facts. Logic programming is a suitable KR medium, but more often than not discussions on this programming paradigm focus on aspects other than KR. In this paper, I elaborate on the general theory of logic programming and give the essentials of two of its main implementations, to wit, Prolog and Datalog, from the viewpoint of deductive computing over knowledge bases, which includes (...) deductive programming. (shrink)

Van Inwagen proposes that besides simples only living organisms exist as composite objects. This paper suggests expanding van Inwagen’s ontology by also accepting composite objects in the case that physical bonding occurs (plus some extra conditions). Such objects are not living organ-isms but rather physical bodies. They include (approximately) the complete realm of inanimate ordinary objects, like rocks and tables, as well as inanimate scientific objects, like atoms and mol-ecules, the latter filling the ontological gap between simples and organisms in (...) van Inwagen’s origi-nal picture. We thus propose a compositional pluralism claiming that composition arises if and on-ly if bonding or life occurs. (shrink)